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Abstract 
In this paper we make a case that strategic voting can be observed and predicted 
even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional 
incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic 
voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives 
constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility 
maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation 
process as a function of situational and dispositional factors. All well-known 
situational incentives to vote strategically that get channeled through the district 
magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for 
voting decisions. Employing district-level data from Finland – because of its 
electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence 
for predictive implications of our theory. 
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Introduction  
Studying strategic voting in PR systems seems to be a hopeless endeavor. The literature on 
electoral systems agrees that under PR many if not all incentives are absent to reduce the 
number of parties or candidates through either strategic entry decisions of political elites or 
strategic voting of voters. The conclusion scholars draw from this is that studying strategic 
voting might be more promising in strong (Sartori 1968) electoral systems possessing a 
variety of incentives for strategic behavior.  
In this paper we argue that this conclusion is too hastily drawn. Focusing on strategic 
behavior of voters this paper makes a case that despite weak incentive structures of electoral 
institutions we have to look more closely how voters actually perceive these incentives and 
form expectations about the outcome of an election in a particular electoral system. Although 
we do not dispute that strategic voting might be easier to observe in plurality systems, even a 
small number of strategic voters in PR systems might have a large political impact, though. 
Since typically single parties do not gain enough seats in such parliaments to form a majority 
government, coalition governments will be necessary. In the election preceding the coalition 
formation process the coordinated effort of even a small number of strategic voters might be 
decisive about the fate of a particular coalition government. Thus strategic voting might prove 
particularly relevant in PR systems despite relatively small in absolute size. 
The paper advances in as follows. First, we revisit the prevalent argument in the 
literature that voters do not have the necessary informational requirements to vote 
strategically in PR systems with large district magnitudes. Second, we develop an argument 
that instead we have to focus systematically on a micro-logic of expectation formation before 
we can derive predictions about strategic voting in PR-systems. Third, we derive predictable 
implications of this micro-logic and, fourth, test them with district level election returns of 
Finish parliamentary elections from 1995-2003. Our results provide considerable support for 
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our hypotheses about the expectation formation process of voters and its relevance for the 
success of parties in parliamentary elections. 
 
Theoretical Background 
What is the impact of electoral systems on an individual’s decision-making process? Voters 
form preferences about the objects on the ballot, parties or candidates. While disagreeing on 
how to model the decision-making process, all traditional theories of voting behavior agree 
that at the end voters should cast their vote for the object on the ballot they prefer most. Thus, 
this literature is blind towards possible influences of electoral systems on vote-choice. 
Conversely, the comparative literature on electoral systems allows for the possibility that the 
same voter might end up voting differently depending on the particular electoral rules used. 
The hypothesized mechanism is known as Duverger’s (1954) “psychological effect”. Voters 
are systematically drawn away from their most preferred party1, just because they realize that 
supporting a marginal party might be equivalent to wasting their vote given a particular 
electoral system. In order to avoid wasting their votes, voters cast a strategic vote for a viable 
party although they prefer another one.  
PR systems offer chances even for marginal parties to gain seats, particularly, if there 
is none or only a small national threshold, thereby a priori reducing the incentives for 
supporter of those parties to cast a strategic vote. How many strategic votes ought to be 
expected? Leys (1959) and Sartori (1968) argue that the smaller the district magnitude is, i.e., 
the fewer seats are awarded at the electoral district level, the stronger the incentives to vote 
strategically. 
Strategic voting supposedly fades out when district magnitude is greater than 5 
because it gets to complicated to satisfy informational requirements (Cox 1997: 100, Cox and 
Shugart 1996, Sartori 1968: 279) which party is marginal. Evidence to support this claim 
                                                 
1 To simplify language we will just refer to political parties, even if voters can explicitly vote for candidates. 
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comes from apparent empirical regularities based on Japanese and Colombian district-level 
results (Cox 1997: Chapter 5, Cox and Shugart 1996) as well as electoral returns in Spanish 
districts (Cox 1997: 115-117, Gunther 1989). The presented evidence does not explain, 
though, why there is suddenly a magic veil that makes it impossible for voters in larger 
districts to sort out whether a vote for their most preferred party is wasted. In fact, looking at 
the expectation formation process more closely as previous research has done we expect to 
find evidence of strategic voting even in PR systems with large districts.  
 
A Micro-logic of Expectation Formation and Hypotheses 
Voters form preferences for parties and derive a utility from voting for their most preferred 
party (Upref). Lets denote the expected probability that a vote will not be wasted, i.e., a voter 
expects his or her most preferred party to win at least a seat in this district by ppref. Thus the 
expected utility, EU(pref), that his or her most preferred party is competitive to gain a seat, 
combines the traditional utility component weighted by the voter’s expectation. Thus 
. This also implies that with probability 1- p U p   EU(pref) prefpref ⋅= pref no gain will be realized 
from voting for his or her most preferred party. Although, it seems quite likely that different 
voters employ different decision rules, we assume that voters’ decision rule is to maximize 
their expected utility from voting. Thus, we expect voters to deviate from their most preferred 
party and cast a strategic vote, the lower the expected probability ppref, i.e., the more uncertain 
voters are whether their most preferred party is able to win a seat.  
Which factors determine these expectations? We argue that the expected probability 
that a vote will not be wasted on a voter’s most preferred party is a function of situational (s) 
and dispositional (d) criteria, i.e., ppref = f(s,d). Electoral institutions provide a set of 
incentives that determine situational criteria. Following the logic of previous research on 
electoral systems we focus on the district magnitude (M) as a situational criterion. The larger 
the district magnitude the lower the threshold for any party to gain seats. While parties are 
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generally motivated to communicate the importance of being represented to their 
constituencies, the incentives should be higher in smaller districts than in larger districts since 
the same vote share might not be enough to gain seats in a small district but sufficient in a 
large district. Consequently, voters are more aware of the wasted vote context in smaller 
districts than in larger districts. Thus, hypothetical voters, holding dispositional factors (d) 
constant, should have a higher expected probability  that their vote is not wasted when 
they are eligible to vote in a district with a large district magnitude than in a district with 
lower district magnitude.  
prefp
Besides situational criteria that are well known in the literature we also introduce 
dispositional criteria of how voters generate expectations about the probability that a vote will 
not be wasted on their most preferred party. Dispositional criteria are determined by 
intrapersonal motivations and capabilities to comprehend such situational criteria, such as the 
district magnitude, and employ them in their decision calculus. For instance, take some 
hypothetical voters in the same electoral district with a fixed district magnitude. They 
nevertheless might have formed different expectations  just because they most prefer 
different parties. Voters supporting parties that are not in danger of loosing representation in a 
given district might not feel constraint to vote strategically at all. The situation is obviously 
different for supporter of marginal parties in a given district. Depending on the nature of the 
race in a particular district and holding constant situational factors (s), a vote for a marginal 
party might be wasted. Formally a voter casts a strategic vote if , i.e., if 
prefp
  EU(pref)EU(strat) >
 U pEU(strat) prefpref ⋅>  








Thus given the expectation that a vote for a marginal party is wasted,  might be small 
enough to tip the seesaw towards voting strategically. 
prefp
Voters employ appropriate decision heuristics in order to form expectations  
whether their vote could possibly be wasted. Party elites, opinion polls or the media are likely 
to provide attentive voters with cues about the outcome of a district race. Even inattentive 
voters - as “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor 1991) – are looking for a way to simplify 
their decision-making process (Gschwend 2001, 22-27). The electoral history heuristic is 
probably such a short-cut that is most easily available for such voters. Voters look back to 
previous elections. Even if they cannot recall the correct result of this election, they can easily 
infer from the rough coordinates of the competitive electoral landscape of previous elections 
to the upcoming election. The simple but crucial question supporters of a marginal party have 
to answer is as to whether they expect their party to gain seats in their district in the upcoming 
election. The expectations  should be much smaller, holding constant situational factors 
(s), if this party has previously gained at most one seat in the district and, thus, is potentially 
in danger of loosing representation there. If voters expect their most preferred party to be in 
danger of not being represented in their district they might waste their votes on this party. 
Thus, the invectives to vote strategically are particularly high for supporters of marginal 
parties if their party had gained none or at most one seat in the previous election in this 
electoral district. It does not require much of a supporter of a marginal party to figure this out. 
Moreover, forming expectations  this way should not be harder for voters in large 
districts than for voters in small districts directly undermining the ad-hoc logic of Cox and 
Shugart’s argument that it simply becomes to hard to form expectations whether a vote for a 
marginal party will be wasted in large districts. No appeal to a magic veil of voter ignorance 





To sum up, a voter’s expectation formation process is a function of situational (s) and 
dispositional (d) factors that are assumed to operate conjointly. In particular, situational 
factors can only operate if voters are dispositionally motivated in the first place – otherwise 
voters do not even consider casting a strategic vote. Thus, if our assumptions about how 
voters form expectations are correct, all well-known situational incentives that get channeled 
through the district magnitude are expected to be moderated by dispositional factors in order 
to become relevant for an individual’s decision-making process. Strategic voters following the 
wasted-vote logic should cast their votes for parties in a given district who will gain 
representation. Thus only if parties are not expected - derived from dispositional (d) 
motivations of voters - to be represented in a given district we expect situational criteria, the 
size of the district magnitude, to kick in. Only if dispositional requirements are fulfilled we 
expect to find any influence on forming the expectation  through incentives that get 
channeled through the district magnitude. In order to derive hypotheses on the electoral 
district level, as previous research has done, we have to aggregate these micro processes. If 
we can assume that dispositional factors are likely to operate for party supporters at the 
electoral district level, the predictions of the Leys-Sartori conjecture should hold. The smaller 
the district magnitude is, the stronger the incentives to vote strategically. Thus, our first 
hypothesis is as follows:  
prefp
If parties are expected to be in danger of loosing representation they should get 
less punished by strategic desertion in large districts than in small districts. 
Consequently, these parties should perform better in large districts than in small 
districts.  
This logic implies, that those parties not in danger of losing representation will benefit from 
strategic voting in the respective districts. In addition to the votes of their loyal supporters 
they might get strategic votes from supporters of other parties that expect their party to be in 
danger of loosing representation. The magnitude of this effect also depends on the district 
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magnitude and should perform reciprocally to the strategic desertion effect. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is as follows:      
If parties are expected not to be in danger of loosing representation they should 
perform better in small districts than in large districts.  
If we find evidence of these hypothesized effects, do these effects have an impact on the 
macro-level structure of the party system? Following our argument, we should find 
predictable consequences for the vote share of small parties on the district level over time. 
Thus, our third hypothesis is dynamic in nature. If our assumption about the process of 
forming expectations on the micro-level can be sustained then the wasted-vote desertion logic 
should lead to a downward trend over time of party vote shares at the electoral district-level 
for parties penalized by strategic voting, while this should not be the case otherwise. If some 
voters will not run the risk to waste their vote on their preferred party in a particular district 
and given that there has been systematic desertion of this party, then, in the next election, the 
expectations  that this party will gain representation will be even smaller. Consequently 
this leads to a higher degree of strategic desertion from a latent level of party support reducing 
the district vote shares of such parties even further. Thus, our third hypothesis is as follows:  
prefp
In those districts, where a party is in danger of loosing representation, its vote 
share should eventually shrink because of strategic desertion. Since we assumed 
that dispositional motivations are a necessary condition for situational factors to 
operate we expect at the same time no systematic decline in districts where a 
party is not in danger of loosing representation. 
 
The Case of Finland 
Our proposed theory describes how any effects of varying size of the district magnitude have 
an impact on the electoral outcome. If there are no additional rules that determine the 
translation of votes into seats (e.g. compensatory seats on a higher level) at the district level, 
the strategic incentives that get channeled through the district magnitude can be isolated. In 
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order to test whether these incentives of strategic voting are not only present in districts with 
small district magnitude but also – albeit to lesser degree - in districts with higher district 
magnitude we need to introduce enough variation in the distribution of our key independent 
variable, district magnitude, and at the same time holding constant alternative explanations. 
Thus, a case study design has an advantage over pooling data from various electoral systems 
because the impact of social cleavages, political culture and the party system can be largely 
controlled given that the elections were held in the same country.  
 Moreover, if our reasoning about expectation formation and its consequences for 
voting behavior is supported by empirical evidence rather than Cox-Shugart’s voter ignorance 
argument, than a particularly hard case to demonstrate evidence supporting our theory stems 
from a PR system with rather large multimember districts. In such an electoral system, 
following Cox and Shugart, we should not find any evidence of strategic voting, whatsoever. 
In contrast to this reasoning, our expectation is that even in large districts we might observe 
evidence of strategic voting if certain party supporters are dispositional motivated in the first 
place. 
Given these institutional requirements, Finland seems a particular interesting case to 
look for any effects of district magnitude on the degree of strategic voting. Finland employs a 
multimember-district electoral system with one tier and no compensatory seats. Additionally 
the district magnitude differs considerably - it ranges from 6 to 33 - and even the smallest 
districts are still considered relatively large by Cox and Shugart’s standards. The voter casts 
his or her ballot in the district for a candidate of a party. The votes of all candidates of one 
party will be summed up at the district level and the number of seats for each party in the 
respective district is calculated by applying the d’Hondt formula. Thus, even in a system that 
allows for personal preference votes the party-logic of the system prevails (Kuusela 1995, 
Pesonen 1995).       
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Our argument is based on the assumption, that a voter’s expectation reflects the 
competitive nature of the district race. But in PR systems like Finland, where the result of 
national elections is the starting point for coalition bargaining process a voter might focus 
might focus the national level instead. If voters in Finland focus on national results in order to 
derive their expectations then one might observe in small districts supporters of national 
medium-sized parties that do not desert in those districts, where they are in danger of loosing 
representation Thus we potentially underestimate the relationship of district magnitude and 
strategic voting if voters derive their expectations based on the competitive nature of the 
national rather than the local race at the district level. 
 
Data, Operationalization and Results 
Since our hypotheses are geared at the electoral district-level and we employ actual election 
returns in order to test them.2 Particularly we pool data from all national elections in Finland 
since 1991, because since the end of the 1980s and the establishment of the Green Party 
(VIHR) the party system has been very stable (Sänkiaho 1995). 3 Thus, we can hold macro-
level trends in the development of the party system constant. Contrary to previous research we 
explicitly formulated predictions about the impact of district magnitude on the amount of 
strategic voting that favors or penalizes certain parties. The standard dependent variable in the 
literature, the effective number of parties, as an aggregate measure of the nature of district 
party competition, does not directly reflect that.4 Instead, the natural candidate of a dependent 
variable is rather the district-level results of various parties. Thus, we employ seven 
                                                 
2 Ideally, a panel survey design clustered on the electoral district level is needed to test our theory about the 
expectation formation process and strategic voting in a PR system such as Finland. This is, of course, not 
available. 
3 The date is provided by ‘Statistics Finland’ and can be downloaded (http://www.stat.fi/index_en.html). 
According to personal information provided by Jaana Asikainen from ‘Statistics Finland’, the governmental 
statistical office, redistricting between 1991 and 2003 is not a problem. In one district, between 1999 (Mikkeli 
district) and 2003 (South Savo), there was some minor redistricting. Nevertheless besides renaming the new 
South Savo district still has about 85 % of the eligible voters of the former Mikkeli district.  
4 Nevertheless, holding other factors constant, the effective number of parties should decline over time in 
districts where some marginal party supporters (of various parties) vote strategically, because these parties will 
be deserted and the larger parties will benefit from it in a given district.  
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dependent variables: the vote shares of seven parties in 14 electoral districts5 in the last four 
elections, i.e. we have 56 observations per party. Descriptive statistics of our dependent 
variables are presented in table 1.  
 
[Table1 about here] 
 
According to Duverger’s Laws the Finnish party system is characterized by its fragmentation. 
During the last decades the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the agrarian Center Party (KESK) 
and the conservative National Coalition Party (KOK) became the dominant parties in Finland. 
Four relevant smaller parties were continuously represented during our time of analysis: the 
left-wing VAS, the Green Party (VIHR), the Christian League (SKL) and the Swedish 
regional party (RKP). The existence of several rainbow coalitions shows that the ideological 
barriers between parties cannot perceived to be very high.6 A dividing line of the party system 
(apart from the ideological) is the difference between the rural north and the urban centers of 
Finland (Sundberg 2000). The SDP has it biggest support in the industrial centers of the South 
and shares the support of the land workers and small farmers for left parties with its left 
counterpart, the VAS, in the rural north. The KOK is a strong party in the urban centers while 
its conservative counterpart, the KESK, is strong in the periphery of the country. A similar 
pattern is recognizable for the smaller parties. The Greens have their strongholds in urban 
districts like Helsinki whereas the VAS is stronger in the periphery. The SKL is a small party, 
which has success throughout the country. The liberal RKP is just a regional party, which is 
supported basically by the Swedish-speaking minority (Sänkiaho 1995, Martikainen and 
Yrjönen 1991). As table 1 shows, all parties vary noticeable in their strength across electoral 
                                                 
5 We exclude the autonomous province of Åland from our analysis because this district does not participate in 
the national seat-allocation system (Kuusela 1995: 24). 
6 If we are willing to believe, that the ideological distance is the main factor in determining voters’ utility 
expectation, the costs of strategic voting seem not to be that high and we should observe a significant level of 
strategic voting.  
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districts. Thus, the expectation formation process of a voter preferring a specific party may 
vary from one district to another. E.g., if a voter prefers the VAS in a relatively large district, 
where the VAS is traditionally strong (say over 20%), this voter has a lower incentive to cast 
a strategic vote than in a relatively small district, where the VAS is traditionally weak (say 
just 5%).    
What would happen if we were wrong and voters simply cast their votes for the party 
they favor most? The observational implication of this individual-level process on the district 
level would be that parties vote shares should be predictable by past performances in that 
district. Given the low electoral volatility within electoral districts (Pesonen 1995) and the 
stable party system in Finland during the time of our analysis (Sundberg 2000), a parties 
previous vote share should be a strong predictor. Thus, we need some kind of normal vote 
baseline to not falsely overestimate the effect of strategic voting induced by situational and 
dispositional factors. Our normal vote (NV) measure is a party’s previous vote share in that 
district. This is a very conservative measure since every party’s normal vote share comprises 
both, its latent support in that district in addition to the number of strategic votes that either 
favored or panelized this party in the previous election. Therefore we potentially 
underestimate the number of votes that are strategically cast or withdrawn from a latent level 
of sincere party support in a given district.  
The Leys-Sartori conjecture posits that the smaller the district magnitude is, i.e., the 
fewer seats are awarded at the electoral district level, the stronger the incentives to vote 
strategically. Since it is likely that the marginal impact of district magnitude M on party vote 
shares at the district level diminishes if M gets larger we logistically transform the district 
magnitude (ln(M)) to account for that. Moreover, our theoretical contribution is to point out 
the conditionality of this conjecture as a consequence of the described expectation formation 
processes that might go on at the individual level. As hypothesized, we anticipate a reduced 
impact of situational incentives on a party’s vote share for larger districts if this party is 
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expected to be in danger of loosing representation. Given the logic behind the electoral history 
heuristic we measure this expectation (EXP) simply by a dummy variable that scores ‘one’ in 
a given district if this party had gained at most one seat in the previous election. In our data 
set the number of such crucial districts varies considerably across parties (KESK: 5 districts, 
SDP: 4 districts, KOK: 14 districts, VAS: 29 districts, VIHR: 49 districts, SKL all districts 
and RKP: 44 districts). The general specification of our models is as follows: 
⋅+= 10 bbY NV ⋅+⋅+ 32 )ln( bMb EXP ⋅⋅+ )ln(4 Mb EXP  e+
Strategic voters following the wasted-vote logic should generally cast their votes for parties 
viable to gain seats. Thus if parties are expected - derived from dispositional motivations of 
voters - to be represented in a district they should benefit from strategic voting, the more the 
smaller the district magnitude is. Thus, for those parties we expect to be negative. The 
situation is different in crucial districts, however, where a party might loose representation, 
i.e. in districts where the expectation dummy (EXP) scores ‘one’. In these electoral districts 
the relationship will be: 
2b
⋅++= 130 )( bbbY NV )ln()( 42 Mbb ⋅++ e+  
According to our first hypothesis parties expected to loose representation should nevertheless 
get punished less and consequently perform better in large districts than in small districts, we 
expect the sum of the respective coefficients )( 42 bb +  to be positive. Since is negative we, 
therefore expect  to be positive.  
2b
4b
We employ ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the model for all seven dependent 
variables. The standard errors are panel-corrected, following Beck and Katz (1996), to 
account for the non-independence in the data structure.7 Table 2 summaries our estimation 
results. 
[Table 2 about here] 
                                                 
7 OLS models with robust White-Huber standard errors clustered by electoral district yield essentially the same 
results.  
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 We employed several independent tests of hypotheses 1 and 2. Because the SDP and the 
KESK were in danger of loosing representation just in one district in each of the four 
elections, a test of the conditionality hypothesis does not make much sense, since there is no 
variance.   These parties should always benefit from support of strategic voters, the more the 
smaller the district. For the SKL the EXP-dummy is ‘one’ for all districts indicating that in 
every district voters should expect a vote for this party to be wasted. This implies, that SKL is 
penalized more the smaller the district magnitude is.   
The results across all parties presented above largely support our expectations. First, 
for all seven models the NV is significant. Thus, in predicting a party’s vote share at the 
district level, the strength of this party there in the previous election is the single most reliable 
indicator across all parties.  
Second, for the parties that do not provide enough variance to allow for a meaningful 
test of the conditionality characteristic we find in correspondence with hypothesis 1 an 
expected (although not quite significant) positive coefficient b2 for the SKL.8 Conversely, in 
correspondence with the second hypothesis we find support for models of the SDP and the 
KESK. A significantly negative coefficient b2 of ln(M) indicates that these parties while 
essentially nowhere in danger of loosing representation are favored more by strategic voting, 
the smaller the district magnitude is.  
Third, if there is enough variation across districts whether voters might expect that 
parties loose representation, we find the respective coefficient (of the interaction-effect of 
ln(M) and EXP) to be positive for all remaining models (VAS, VIHR, KOK, RKP) and a 
significant effect for the models of VAS and VIHR. The results for VAS and VIHR provide 
strong evidence of our first hypothesis. While we get the predicted sign, one conceivable 
4b
                                                 
8 The significance may be undermined by expressive voting. Based on survey data Borg (1995: 149) provides 
evidence that the proportion of party supporters having expressive motifs among all parties is the largest for 
supporters of the SKL and the RKP (57 and 61%, respectively compared to at most 36% for all other parties). 
Thus, even if the pSKL of these SKL-supporters is low, their utility USKL may be so large, that their EU(SKL) will 
be high enough to vote for the SKL - no matter what.  
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explanation that there is no significant effect in the RKP model has to do with  the nature of 
its supporting base. It is reasonable to assume, that for members of the Swedish-speaking 
minority the utility Ustrat of a vote for any other party is very low, so that EU(strat) is always 
smaller than EU(RKP), even if the  is very low, because the party is in danger of loosing 
representation.
RKPp
9 The non-findings of the KOK model might have something to do with the 
way their supporters form expectations about the changes of winning seats in the district. 
Given  that since 1987 the KOK was one of two large parties (the other was the KESK or the 
SDP) constituting the core of the respective government coalition, supporters might just focus 
on the national level. The KOK’s important role in government might anchor the expectation 
formation process of their supporters at the national and not as assumed by our theory at the 
district level. 
Furthermore, the expectation about the size of  such that 4b )( 42 bb +  is positive is also 
supported for models of the VAS and the VIHR and, although not significantly, through the 
SKL model. This party is threatened to be penalized by strategic desertion in every district, 
though.  is larger for VIHR (1.3) than for VAS (0.4). In table 3 we show for the 
VIHR and the VAS the effect of strategic voting in districts where these parties are 
endangered to loose representation (i.e., EXP=1) as well as the size of the counterfactual 
effect if these parties where not perceived to be in danger of loosing representation in a 
particular district (i.e. the difference of EXP=1 and EXP=0).  
)( 42 bb +
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
If the VIHR is in danger of loosing representation (EXP=1), the effect of strategic voting 
would lead on average to about 1.4 %-points more votes in a district with 17 seats than in the 
smallest district (M=6) in Finland and to 1.9 %-points more votes in the largest district 
                                                 
9 Among the RKP-supporters there is the largest proportion of expressive voters (Borg 1995: 149). 
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(M=30) than in the smallest district holding the normal vote constant. This effect is stronger 
than for the VAS, where the vote share would be just 0.4% higher (and 0.7%, respectively). 
The size of the dispositional effect of being endangered or not differs remarkably between 
both parties. Again, this effect depends on the district magnitude. For a M of 17 the predicted 
vote share would shrink on average about 5.5%-points for the VIHR and 1.1%-points for the 
VAS in districts where these parties are perceived to be the danger of loosing representation 
compared to an hypothetical district of the same size where these parties are expected to win 
seats easily. Our dispositional factor has its largest impact in small districts (M=6), where the 
VAS would get 3.9%-points less than in a safe district of the same size. The VIHR would face 
to be deserted completely in such a district given the predicted magnitude of the dispositional 
effect of 14.4%-points. 
In order to generate evidence for our third hypothesis we have to analyze party vote 
shares over time while distinguishing districts where we expect a systematic decline of 
support from those districts where parties are not expected to be in danger of loosing 
representation. Since only dispositional factors determine the generating mechanism behind 
this hypothesized trend we average party district-level results across election years. In the 
following figure 1 we present for each party10 the average vote share by year relative to the 
national result separated by the EXP-dummy. The points above the zero axis show the 
averaged results of safe districts, the points below present the averaged results of the 
endangered districts, where the dispositional factors are presumably present, relative to the 
party’s national result.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
10 Not for the SKL, because the EXP-dummy is one for all districts,. 
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Our third hypothesis predicts that in those districts, where a party is in danger of loosing 
representation, its vote share should eventually shrink because of strategic desertion. So, the 
figure above provides evidence for our claim that dispositional motivations are a necessary 
condition for situational factors to operate. If they are present we clearly see across parties a 
decline in vote shares while if they are absent we cannot find such a trend for districts in 
which the party is not in danger of loosing representation. We find this trend of a negative 
regression line for the endangered districts for the VIHR, the VAS and if we were to exclude 
the 1991-election we also find evidence for the KOK. Moreover, even for the one district 
where SDP and KESK theoretically face strategic desertion this trend can be observed. Only 
the RKP shows a wrong direction, but as argued above, the language-based nature of the party 
might undermine the logic of strategic desertion to a large extent.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we make a case that despite weak incentive structures of electoral institutions 
there might be nevertheless indications of strategic voting. Contrary to the literature we do not 
see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying 
strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives 
constrain an individual’s decision-making process. We argued that we have to look more 
closely how voters actually perceive these incentives and form expectations about the 
outcome of an election in a particular electoral system in order to evaluate and finally predict 
their voting behavior. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic 
of an individuals expectation formation process. We assume that this process is a function of 
situational and dispositional factors. All well-known situational incentives to vote 
strategically that get channeled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional 
factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing district-level data from 
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Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find 
considerable evidence for predictive implications of our theory.  
Across parties we find that if parties are expected to be in danger of loosing 
representation these parties get punished less by strategic desertion and hence perform better 
in large districts than in small districts. And conversely, if parties are expected not to be in 
danger of loosing representation, however, we find evidence that they perform generally 
better in small districts than in large districts. Moreover, the impact of strategic voting over 
time has further predictable implications for the success of parties at the polls. At least based 
on four time points we clearly see that a parties vote shares in districts do shrink over time 
because of strategic desertion if they are in danger of loosing representation, and, conversely, 
we do not find at the same time such a systematic decline in districts where a party is not in 
danger of loosing representation. Further research using survey data has to provide more 
evidence as to whether our proposed micro-logic of forming expectations is valid. Such data 
is not yet available for the case of Finland. Moreover we would like to expand this research 
design in future iterations of this work both, over time and across electoral systems to provide 
more empirical evidence that studying strategic voting is particularly relevant for election 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of all Dependent Variables 
 









      
KESK 26.2 11.9 3.7 49.8 
KOK 18.0 6.1 8.8 28.7 
VAS 10.9 5.6 2.7 27.1 
VIHR 6.3 3.4 1.8 18.4 
SDP 25.2 7.2 11.3 39.4 
SKL 4.2 2.2 0.8 9.8 
RKP 3.3 6.0 0 20.7 
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Table 2: Estimated effects of Strategic Voting on the Success of Finish Parties at the electoral 
district level, 1995-2003  
Party Independent Variables Coeff. Std. Err. p-value R
2
SDP NV 0.796 0.135 0.000  
 ln(M) -1.356 0.804 0.092  
 EXP ---    
 ln(M)*EXP ---    
 Constant 8.794 4.907 0.073 0.67 
      
KESK NV 0.851 0.108 0.000  
 ln(M) -3.375 1.665 0.043  
 EXP ---    
 ln(M)*EXP ---    
 Constant 14.478 6.876 0.035 0.83 
      
SKL NV 1.03 0.145 0.000  
 ln(M) 0.216 0.498 0.664  
 EXP ---    
 ln(M)*EXP ---    
 Constant 0.057 1.203 0.962 0.67 
      
KOK NV 0.867 0.101 0.000  
 ln(M) 2.500 1.153 0.030  
 EXP -1.456 4.573 0.750  
 ln(M)*EXP 1.536 2.032 0.450  
 Constant -5.565 2.472 0.024 0.81 
      
VAS NV 0.852 0.093 0.000  
 ln(M) -2.263 0.628 0.000  
 EXP -8.711 2.482 0.000  
 ln(M)*EXP 2.698 0.766 0.000  
 Constant 8.698 2.759 0.002 0.92 
      
VIHR NV 0.630 0.185 0.001  
 ln(M) -7.159 2.879 0.013  
 EXP -29.607 11.520 0.010  
 ln(M)*EXP 8.497 3.433 0.013  
 Constant 28.685 10.875 0.008 0.84 
      
RKP NV 0.978 0.048 0.000  
 ln(M) -0.419 1.455 0.773  
 EXP -0.861 4.436 0.846  
 ln(M)*EXP 0.357 1.438 0.804  
 Constant 0.988 4.511 0.827 0.99 
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Table 3: Estimated Causal Effects depending on District Magnitude 
 VIHR   VAS 
 if EXP=1 Difference  
EXP=1 - EXP=0 
  if EXP=1 Difference  
EXP=1 - EXP=0 
M (b2+b4)*ln(M) b4*ln(M)   (b2+b4)*ln(M) b4*ln(M) 
6 2.3 -14.4   0.7 -3.9 
17 3.7 -5.5   1.1 -1.1 
30 4.4 -0.7   1.4 0.5 
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